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The Duty to Warn within the Implied Warranty
of Merchantability: Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc.
The recent North Carolina decision of Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc.'
added yet another weapon to the consumer's arsenal against merchants
and manufacturers. Despite the rapid development of products liability
law over the last fifty years and the deluge of state and federal regulation of
consumer goods, the courts are unsatisfied with the level of protection
afforded the average American consumer. They continue to find new legal
theories and expand old ones to aid the inexperienced consumer in coping
with our complex and highly technological marketplace. Reid, by its
finding that a warning of possible product hazards was a requisite to
merchantability, 2 will greatly facilitate future claims of breach of implied
warranty of merchantability.
The duty to warn of the dangerous propensities of one's product has
long been an accepted source of tort liability under negligence principles.3
As strict products liability gained acceptance and developed, the failure to
provide adequate warnings made a product defective and unreasonably
dangerous under that theory as well. This Case Comment will examine the
role that duty now plays in an implied warranty of merchantability case.
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
A claim of breach of warranty originally sounded in tort as an action
for trespass on the case for deceit. Later, pleading a warranty indebitatus
assumpsit brought it within the sales arena, and it has largely remained
identified with contracts to date.6 Warranties have long been an integral
part of the products liability field. 7 Early in this century, the idea of
warranty as a form of strict liability without proof of negligence was
accepted by the courts as grounds for recovery by an injured buyer
against a seller.8 Initially the privity doctrine9 made recovery against the
1. 40 N.C. App. 476,253 S.E.2d 344, discretionary review denied, 297 N.C. 612,257 S.E.2d 219
(1979).
2. Id. at 482,253 S.E.2d at 348-49.
3. Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REV.
145 (1955) has a thorough discussion of the duty to warn of product hazards under negligence
principles.
4. Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256
(1969) provides an excellent analysis of the duty to warn within the context of strict liability.
5. W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 at 8 (1979).
6. Id. Prosser described warranty as "a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and
contract." Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791,
800(1966).
7. See Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns 468 (N.Y. 1815), which held the seller of defective beef
liable on the grounds of warranting the wholesomeness of the food product.
8. Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
9. Generally the rule was "that a manufacturer or seller of a product alleged to have caused injury
could not be held liable for such injury to one with whom the manufacturer or seller was not in privity
of contract." 2 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 10:2 at 331 (2d ed.
1974). Averbach explains "the privity requirement was that the consumer of goods could not sue the
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manufacturer or by an injured person other than the buyer difficult, but
this barrier has been greatly circumscribed or removed by the courts.'0
The Uniform Commercial Code, like its predecessor, the Uniform
Sales Act, contains a number of warranty provisions, both express and
implied." One such provision, the implied warranty of merchantability, is
often the basis for products liability litigation. 12 White and Summers have
called section 2-314 "the most important warranty in the Code"'3 and "first
cousin to strict tort liability."14 Although section 2-314 embraces a form of
strict liability in that negligence does not have to be shown, the plaintiff is
still burdened with demonstrating that the defendant's product deviated
from the standard of merchantability and that this deviation proximately
and actually caused harm to the plaintiff. 5
One of the main problems in a section 2-314 case is definition of the
merchantability standard. Section 2-314 has given the courts some
guidance to this problem by providing:
Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as:
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity, within each unit among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.1
6
Although the above criteria speak of "adequately labeled" and "confor-
ming to affirmations made on the label," the Code does not expressly
require warnings of product dangers as a requisite to merchantability.
Thousands of cases have addressed this question of what constitutes a
merchantable good;' 7 most section 2-314 cases finding unmerchantable
goods concerned products that "did not work properly or were
manufacturer of them for breach of contract, which would include breach of warranty, unless the
goods were sold by the producer to the consumer, i.e., that the transaction was between the parties to
the lawsuit." 3B A. AVERBACH, HANDLING ACCIDENT CASES, § 5 at 3B:6 (1971).
10. 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3:6 (2d ed. 1974). See3B
A. AVERBACH, HANDLING ACCIDENT CASES, §§ 5-13 (1971). For a discussion of privity requirements
under the Uniform Commercial Code see 2R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY §§ 10:4-10:7 (2d ed. 1974).
11. U.C.C. article2.
12. U.C.C.§2-314.




16. U.C.C. § 2-314(2).
17. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
9-7 at349(1980).
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unexpectedly harmful" due to a defect. 18 Whether lack of a warning on a
product is an unmerchantable defect is a novel question.
The courts have recognized that both manufacturers and retailers
have a duty to warn adequately of foreseeable dangers that might arise as
the result of the proper and intended use of a product;' 9 a failure to
perform this duty with reasonable care is a source of liability under
negligence principles.2 ° Even if a product is designed and manufactured
with reasonable care, liability thus may result if there is an inherent danger
that has not been made known to the user. This duty is also expressed in
section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides in part:
One who supplies . . . a chattel for another to use is subject to
liability . . for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner
for which . .. it is supplied, if the supplier .. . (c) fails to exercise
reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts
which make it likely to be dangerous.
2
'
A similar duty has been found with respect to strict liability; if a
product is not accompanied by adequate warnings or directions, it may be
defective and unreasonably dangerous.22 Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, relating to the doctrine of strict liability, provides: "One
who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property ... .2 A comment to this section explains that "[i]n order to
prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be
18. Id. at 35 1.
19. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTs LIABILITY § 8.01 (1979) and cases cited therein; 2A
L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18.02 (1979) and cases cited therein. See Dillard
and Hart, Product Liability. Directionsfor Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REv. 145 (1955) fora
discussion of the duty to warn of product hazards under negligence principles.
20. Id.
21. The full text reads as follows:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to
liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the
other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the
chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for
which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its
dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts
which make it likely to be dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 388 (1965).
22. 2 L. FRUNMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A [4] [f] [vi] (1979). See Noel,
Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256 (1969) for an
analysis of the duty to warn within strict tort liability principles.
23. The full text reads as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold.
1980]
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required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use. 24
Not all jurisdictions, however, have adopted strict liability.2" Often a
claim of negligence presents impossible proof problems and exposes the
plaintiff to damaging defenses such as contributory negligence. As an
alternative to strict liability or negligence, one might argue that failure to
warn of hazards connected with a product is a breach of warranty. In Reid,
the plaintiff took precisely that approach, claiming that failure to warn was
a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 26 Courts, however,
have split regarding the recognition of this theory27 and have been vague
concerning the required proof in such a case.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
According to the evidence presented at trial in Reid v. Eckerds Drugs,
Inc., defendant had sold an aerosol can of five-day antiperspirant to Mrs.
Reid. 28 One morning while preparing for work, Mr. Reid generously
sprayed some of the deodorant under his arms and to his neck.29 After
setting the can down and walking across the room, Mr. Reid picked up a
cigarette and struck a match, whereupon he burst into blue flame. 30 As a
result, Mr. Reid suffered serious burns that followed the pattern of the
application of the antiperspirant. 31 The can contained a limited warning
and directions with which Mr. Reid admitted he was familiar.32 The
evidence also demonstrated that the deodorant formulation was
approximately ninety-two percent alcohol. No mention was made of this
fact on the label although Mr. Reid indicated that he knew the can
contained alcohol.33
Other evidence included an experiment in which defendant's expert
attempted to replicate the accident. 34 His findings were that the anti-
perspirant would not ignite unless a match were held one and one-quarter
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, commentj (1965).
25. See W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 14 n.41 (1979). Ohio, however, is one of
the states that recognizes strict products liability. The Ohio Supreme Court adopted strict products
liability in Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317,364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
26. Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476,253 S.E.2d 344 (1979).
27. 2 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8:29 at 226 (2d ed.
1974).





33. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 4 , Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc. 40 N.C. App. 476,253 S.E.2d
344(1979).
34. Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476,478,253 S.E.2d 344,346 (1979).
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inches from a wetted surface.35 Defendant also brought forth evidence of
prior marketing of vast amounts of this product without similar com-
pliants.36
Mr. Reid alleged negligence and breach of warranty against the
retailer, Eckerds Drugs, Inc., and the manufacturer, J. P. William Co.,
Inc.37 Following a ruling of summary judgment against him on all counts
by the trial judge, Mr. Reid dropped his negligence claims and appealed on
the sole claim of breach of the implied warranty of merchantability against
the retailer. 38 After a general review of the warranty of merchantability, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding:
When one views the product holistically, and especially where dangerous
propensities under specified conditions inhere to both container and contents
as well as their several interfaces, a failure to adequately warn of all such
propensities may, in a proper case, render a product unmerchan-
table . . . and provide grounds for an action to recover damages for breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability.39
III. THE DUTY TO WARN
The Reid court noted that the question whether the implied warranty
of merchantability embraced a duty to warn of a product's dangerous
propensities was a novel question for the North Carolina courts.4° In
finding that the duty did exist, the court relied in part on two state court
decisions from other jurisdictions, which are not as supportive of the
proposition as the Reid decision indicated. The opinion cited Hanson v.
Murray41 to support the general proposition that the implied warranty of
merchantability may include a duty to warn.42 In Hanson, weed killer was
applied to rows of carrots planted between orange trees. The trees
subsequently sustained damage purportedly due to the weed killer. The
Hanson court focused on the facts that the supplier knew the spray would
cause harm to orange trees and also knew that, at the Hanson farm, the
carrot beds to which the herbicide was to be applied were between rows of
orange trees.4 3 On the basis of these facts the court concluded:
Failure to warn . . . of the danger under these facts was both actionable
negligence and the factor which caused the warranty to be breached. The
existence of negligence does not obviate the possibility that a warranty was
breached and it is clear that the same operative facts can, under proper
35. Id. Defendant-appellee's brief, however, indicates a match must be held even closer, 3/8 of
an inch to one inch, in order to ignite a surface wetted with the deodorant. Brief for Defendant-
Appellee at 6, Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476,253 S.E.2d 344 (1979).
36. Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476,478,253 S.E.2d 344,346 (1979).
37. Id. at 478-79,253 S.E.2d at 347.
38. Id. at479,253 S.E.2d at 347.
39. Id. at 482, 253 S.E.2d at 348-49.
40. Id. at 480, 253 S.E.2d at 347.
41. 190 Cal. App. 2d 617,12 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1961).
42. Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476,482,253 S.E.2d 344,349 (1979).
43. Hanson v. Murray, 190 Cal. App. 2d 617,12 Cal. Rptr. 304,306 (1961).
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circumstances, give rise to both causes of action. We believe that such
circumstances exist here.4
This case actually arose under the U.C.C.'s predecessor, the Uniform Sales
Act, and the claim was a breach of section 15(1), which is similar to U.C.C.
section 2-315, warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.45 The thrust of
the court's decision was that when "[t]he company understood that the
spray was for carrots located in close proximity to orange trees," the
supplier was obliged to inform the buyer that the goods were not fit for that
particular purpose although the goods were fit for the general purpose of
killing weeds.46 More specifically, the court was not saying the goods were
not merchantable because of a failure to warn of a danger when used a
particular way, but rather that the supplier's knowledge of the intended use
and farm layout coupled with his silence implied a warranty that the goods
were fit for that particular situation. When the weed killer turned out to be
damaging under those circumstances, the warranty was breached. The
Reid defendant's statement of Hanson's holding as expressed in his
petition for discretionary review seems closer on point:
[W]here the supplier of a product knows that the use of his product under
certain circumstances will cause damage and the buyer makes known to the
seller that the product is to be used under those circumstances and it appears
that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment then the seller must warn
the potential user of the danger inherent in using the product under those
circumstances and failure to do so is a breach of an implied warranty of
fitness.
47
The Hanson holding relates to the much narrower duty to warn of
known dangers of a known particular use, rather than a general duty to
warn of all possible uses. In Reid, the warranty that the product was fit to
serve as deodorant was much more general in nature. No special or
unusual uses or circumstances were contemplated. The seller had no
knowledge that the buyer was going to use the product in any special way,
and, therefore, the seller did not have a duty to warn the buyer that the
product could not be used safely in that manner.
The Reid court may have been using Hanson as an analogy to
demonstrate that implied warranties could include duties to warn, and the
opinion later noted that similar expectations on the part of the buyer arise
out of the warranties of fitness and merchantability. 48 That does not
44. Id. at 623-24,12 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
45. The Code describes the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose as:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for
which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill orjudgment to
select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
U.C.C. §2-315.
46. Hanson v. Murray, 190 Cal. App. 2d 617, 623, 12 Cal. Rptr. 304, 307 (1961) (emphasis
omitted).
47. Defendant's Petition for Discretionary Review at 11-12, Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 297
N.C. 612, 257 S.E.2d 219 (1979).
48. Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476,484,253 S.E.2d 344,350 (1979).
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necessarily follow, however, for the two U.C.C. sections embrace different
concepts and standards.
The other case upon which the Reid court relied, 49 Hamon v.
Digliani,50 was also a dubious case to cite for the proposition that the
implied warranty of merchantability includes a duty to warn. The North
Carolina court described Hamon as "holding that, where a product was
advertised as 'safe and easy' on hands, that product was not merchantable
where it was capable of causing burns on contact and where warnings did
not explicitly so indicate."5 1 Actually, the Hamon court did not find any
particular product to be unmerchantable due to inadequate warnings. The
case arose out of the purchase of a household cleaner in reliance on
substantial advertising, and the plaintiff received burns when the cleaner
subsequently spilled on her. The plaintiff brought suit against the retail
storekeeper and the manufacturers for breach of express and implied
warranties. The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer to the
complaint on the basis of lack of privity52 The Hamon decision thus
focused on the issue whether lack of privity is a bar to an action based on a
breach of warranty.
In explaining how the implied warranty arises from the manufacturer
in the absence of privity, the Hamon court suggested that there might be a
duty to warn. 3 The court reasoned:
The manufacturer or producer who puts a commodity for personal use or
consumption on the market in a sealed package or other closed container
should be held to have impliedly warranted to the ultimate consumer that the
product is reasonably fit for the purpose intended and that it does not contain
any harmful and deleterious ingredient of which due and ample warning has
not been given. Where the manufacturer or producer makes representations
in his advertisements or by the labels on his products as an inducement to the
ultimate purchaser, the manufacturer or producer should be held to strict
accountability to any person who buys the product in reliance on the
representations and later suffers injury because the product fails to conform
to them. Lack of privity is not a bar to suit under these circumstances. 4
Standing alone, the above quote appears to mandate a warning of harmful
ingredients as a requisite of merchantability, but when read in the context
of the case, it is used as a policy argument for overcoming lack of privity. 5
In other words, the court appears to be saying that these are strong reasons
to ignore privity, or at least these are situations in which the absence of
privity will be overlooked. The court, however, was concerned "only with
the sufficiency of the second count [breach of warranty] to withstand
49. Id. at 483,253 S.E.2d at 349.
50. 148 Conn. 710,174 A.2d 294 (1961).
51. Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476,483,253 S.E.2d 344,349 (1979).
52. Hamonv. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174A.2d294(1961).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 718, 174 A.2d at 297-98 (citations omitted).
55. Id.
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demurrer [from a challenge of no privity] and not with the proof that will
be required on the trial."' 6
The Reid court, however, is not alone in its opinion that section 2-314
embraces a duty to warn. Although the issue has not been litigated
extensively, the courts have held both ways on it, with the more recent
decisions tending to find a duty.57 Nevertheless, two cases that quite
explicitly rejected the idea of a duty to warn as part of an implied warranty
were Muncy v. Magnolia Chemical Co. 58 and Reddick v. White
Consolidated Industries, Inc.
59
In Muncy, the plaintiff developed a rash when he was accidentally
sprayed with a lice insecticide. He brought suit against the manufacturer
alleging breach of implied warranty and negligence for failure to provide
an adequate warning on the product. The plaintiff rested his claim on the
ground that the warning on the defendant's product did not comply with
state and federal insecticide statutes and regulations.60 The court,
following the strict liability theory expressed in section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, found a duty on the part of the
manufacturer to warn users of the inherently dangerous product and that
the adequacy of the warning on the label was a question of fact.61 Despite
finding a question of adequate warning under strict liability, the court
refused to find such an issue under warranty.62 With respect to the
warranty theory, the court stated: "[W]e are of the opinion there could be
no recovery under this record on the basis of implied warranty ....
There is no evidence the product was defective or that it was not fit for the
purpose for which it was sold. 63 In other words, an inadequate warning
would not be a defect that would make a product unmerchantable.
The other case that specifically rejected a duty to warn in the implied
warranty of merchantability, Reddick, was an action for asphyxiation
against a manufacturer of a gas heater.64 The plaintiff alleged both a
breach of express and implied warranties due to the lack of appropriate
56. Id.at718-19, 174 A.2d at298.
57. Cases against finding a duty to warn under the implied warranty of merchantability include
Reddick v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 295 F.Supp. 243 (S.D. Ga. 1969); Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App.
2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964); Muncyv. Magnolia Chem. Co., 437 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
See American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 252 Or. 182, 448 P.2d 515 (1968).
Cases supporting view that the implied warranty of merchantability embraces a duty to warn include
Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971); Wilhelm v. Globe Solvent Co., 373 A.2d 218
(Del. Super. 1977); Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976). See Harris v.
Belton, 258 Cal. App. 2d 595, 65 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1968); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal.
App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 II1. App. 2d 42, 198
N.E.2d 681 (1964).
58. 437 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
59. 295 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
60. Muncy v. Magnolia Chem. Co., 437 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 20.
64. Reddickv. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
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warnings concerning the dangers of faulty installation. The court, without
giving reasons, held the express warranty made no such claim and that the
"[l]ack of adequate warning by a seller concerning the danger of carbon
monoxide gas . . . may create liability under the general law of
negligence but the manufacturer's failure to warn the consumer is not, as I
see it, a breach of implied warranty."
65
Three of the clearest statements of the other side of the issue all
concerned situations in which the failure to warn of a danger was alleged to
be both negligence and a defect breaching the implied warranty of
merchantability. 66 In Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc.,67 paraffin hair curlers
ignited and sparked an apartment fire when the water in which they were
heated was allowed to boil away. Their package contained a cautionary
note about the danger of letting the water boil dry. The court found:
[A] supplier and a manufacturer of a chattel are liable to all whom they
should expect will use the chattel or be endangered by its use if (a) they know
or have reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the
use for which it is supplied, (b) they lack reason to believe that the user will
realize the potential danger, and (c) they fail to exercise reasonable care to
inform of its dangerous condition or the facts which make it likely to be
dangerous.68
These elements are negligence standards from section 388 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 69 but the court added that "[t]he same is
true with respect to a cause of action for breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability under the Uniform Commercial Code, as that warranty is
breached when goods are not 'fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used.' ,70 The court also tested the sufficiency of the evidence
concerning a jury issue of negligence and concluded that "while the
separate theories of negligence and breach of warranty are not always
coextensive, we think the same evidence sufficient to constitute ajury issue
as to whether the rollers were of merchantable quality.
71
The Kansas Supreme Court in Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc. 72 went
through a similar analysis and arrived at a like conclusion. In Jones,
properly odorized propane gas leaked into a cellar and was set off by a
lighted cigarette. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants breached their duty to
give adequate warning of the hazards and characteristics (including odor)
of propane gas and that this failure to warn was both negligence and a
65. Id. at 249.
66. Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971); Wilhelm v. Globe Solvent Co., 373
A.2d 218 (Del. Super. 1977); Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 219 Kan. 627,549 P.2d 1383 (1976).
67. 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971).
68. Id.at 242.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 388, 395 (1965).
70. Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 1971).
71. Id.at243.
72. 219 Kan. 627,549 P.2d 1383(1976).
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defect in the product under strict liability and implied warranty.73
Accepting this argument, the court held that the failure to warn of the
properties of the gas, especially its peculiar smell, may constitute "both
negligence under Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts, § 388, or make
the product 'defective' under the theories of implied warranty or strict
liability in tort. '74 Here again the court looked to negligence principles and
said they also apply to implied warranties.
Another case proceeding along these lines, Wilhelm v. Globe Solvent
Co.,75 concerned a dry cleaning employee who was burned when a
protective towel he wore became saturated with a cleaning solvent and was
inadvertently ignited by a cigarette. Plaintiff sued the distributor of the
solvent alleging that the failure to warn of the dangerous propensities of
the product was negligence and breached the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.7 6 The court noted
that since these theories were all based on the same contention they would
be discussed together, and, citing negligence principles, the court
concluded "[ilt is well established that a product, although virtually
faultless in design, material, and workmanship, may nevertheless be
deemed defective where the manufacturer fails to discharge a duty to
warn."
77
Until Reid, the theory that a failure to warn was a breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability seemed to be riding on the coattails of
negligence actions. If a plaintiff was able to demonstrate that a
manufacturer or supplier was negligent in breaching a duty to warn, then it
was not an untenable position for a court to consider that same duty to be a
part of an implied warranty. Reid, however, untied the warranty cause of
action from the negligence claim and firmly established that a failure to
provide adequate warnings of product hazards could be a breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability standing alone. Such a cause of
action will be a boon to injured consumers who hesitate to bring a suit
because of the difficulties in proving negligence and who are within
jurisdictions that do not recognize strict products liability.
IV. ELEMENTS TO BE PROVED
A. Generally
In an implied warranty of merchantability case, a claimant must
demonstrate "(1) that a merchant sold goods, (2) which were not
'merchantable' at the time of sale, and (3) injury and damages to the
plaintiff or his property (4) caused proximately and in fact by the defective
73. Id.
74. Id. at 635, 549 P.2d at 1391-92.
75. 373 A.2d 218 (Del. Super. 1977).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 223, citing 63 AM. JUR. 2d Products Liability§ 42(1972).
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nature of the goods, and (5) notice to seller of injury." 8 Reid indicated
these elements remain the basis for a claim of breach of warranty due to a
failure to warn of product dangers.79 Usually the second and fourth
elements create the greatest difficulties for breach of warranty claimants, 0
but within the context of a failure to warn case, the proof problems are
lessened.
For example, ordinarily a plaintiff must demonstrate that the product
had a defect at the time of sale (and that no alterations were made
thereafter) in order to prove that the product was unmerchantable when
sold.8' When a manufacturing or design defect is alleged, expensive and
often incomprehensible expert testimony plus thorough technical research
may be required to prove the defect and to show there were no subsequent
alterations. However, in a failure to warn case, whether arising under a
negligence, strict liability, or warranty theory, the alleged defect pertains to
the package or container, not to the contents or product itself. 2 According
to Reid, one need only produce the label in question, explain its
inadequacy, and show that it is identical to all other labels on the same
78. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
9-6at343 (1980).
79. Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C.App. 476,480,253 S.E.2d 344,347 (1980).
80. J. WHITE& R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
9-7 (1980).
81. Falcon Equip. Corp. v. Courtesy Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 536 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1976);
Holcomb v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 439 F.2d 1150(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 827(1971); Prutch v.
Ford Motor Co., 40 Colo. App. 129, 574 P.2d 102 (1977); Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc., 33 Conn. Supp.
108, 364 A.2d 1221 (1975); Guardian Ins. Co. v. Anacostia Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 320 A.2d 315
(D.C. App. 1974); Martineau v. Walker, 97 Idaho 246, 542 P.2d 1165 (1975); Linscott v. Smith, 3 Kan.
2d 1, 587 P.2d 1271 (Kan. App. 1978); Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181
(1975); Kriedlerv. Pontiac Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 514S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Ballouv.
Trahan, 133 Vt. 185,334 A.2d 409 (1975).
82. From a practicing attorney's point of view the advantages in alleging a failure to warn over
maintaining a claim of defect in the design or manufacturing process are twofold:
(a) Simplicity. To prove a defect in design or assembly may require the plaintiff to present
highly technical evidence that a jury may fail to comprehend. Further, in challenging a
product design, the plaintiff is frequently confronted by experts who have a greatly superior
knowledge of the product than any expert the plaintiff may be able to produce-the engineer
or designer of the product itself. On the other hand, evidence that the plaintiff was injured
because he failed to realize that a product he was using was highly flammable, or would not
support a foreseeable weight, or would not withstand foreseeable usage, or that a drug was
likely to produce serious side effects of which the plaintiff was unaware, and not cautioned
against, is not only a claim that the layman can understand, it may also be one with which he
canidentify.
(b) Economy. Proving a design or assembly case frequently requires the services of expert
witnesses, models, photographs, diagrams and extensive research into the technical aspects of
the product, and a corresponding cost that may be prohibitive in all but the most serious type
of case, and to all but the most experienced attorney.
A failure to warn case is not likely to require such expenditures. The "defecet" lies not within
the product, but on the label, or the container, or the package insert. Essentially, it consists of
a failure to communicate, and proof of this may require nothing more than the product label
or container itself, and the testimony of the plaintiff that he did not recognize the danger that
resulted in his injury. In certain cases, expert testimony of the necessity and feasibility of a
warning, or of the casual connection between the product and the injury may be necessary.
W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 191 (1979).
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
product to demonstrate the product's unmerchantable quality at time of
sale. 83
B. A Duty to Warn has Arisen
The Reid court did not address the question of when a duty to warn of
product dangers arises with respect to merchantability. It seemed to
assume that under the circumstances of the case such notice was
automatically necessary. Under negligence principles, however, there is no
duty to warn of every possible danger connected with the use of a product;
only when a seller or manufacturer knows or has reason to know that his
product may be dangerous when used properly and when he has no reason
to expect the user will realize the danger does such a duty arise. 4 In
determining the presence of a duty to warn in a negligence context, one
author explains that the courts primarily balance the following three
factors: "first, how likely is an accident to occur when the product is put to
a more or less expectable use; second, if an accident does occur, how
serious an injury is likely to result; and third, how feasible is it to give an
effective warning? '"85
The duty to warn under strict liability arises similarly, although
foreseeability of the danger may not be a prerequisite.86 Theoretically,
since under strict tort liability a seller of a defective product incurs liability
in spite of exercising all possible care, the duty to warn may arise absent
any foreseeability or knowledge of harm.87 Commentators suggest that, in
practice, foreseeability may be a consideration in the decision whether to
apply strict tort liability. 88 In addition, comments to section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts suggest a number of limitations on this
duty to warn with respect to common allergies to ingredients or dangers
due to excessive consumption.89
The warranty cases offer only minimal guidance concerning when a
warning of hazards is necessary to make a product merchantable. Gardner
found that a duty to warn as part of the implied warranty of
merchantability arises under the same circumstances as under negligence
principles.90 According to that court the standards for determining the
applicability of a duty are (1) the seller or manufacturer know or have
reason to know the product is likely to be dangerous for its intended use;
(2) they have no reason to expect the user will realize the danger; and (3)
83. Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476,485-86,253 S.E.2d 344,350 (1979).
84. W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 192 (1979).
85. Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256,
265(1969).
86. Id. at 267.
87. W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 193 (1979).
88. Id.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS & 402A, commentj (1966).
90. Gardnerv. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971).
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they fail to exercise reasonable care to inform of its dangerous condition.91
Jones likewise lumped all the theories together and found that "[a] seller
has a duty to warn concerning a dangerous product only when he knows or
has reason to know that the product is or is likely to be dangerous for the
use for which it is supplied. 'g Wilhelm set a similar standard discussing
negligence and implied warranty theories together.93 The Wilhelm court
found that the "duty to warn arises when a manufacturer or seller of a
product which, to his actual or constructive knowledge, involves danger to
users, places the product on the market. 94 These cases suggest that absent
any other precedent to follow regarding warnings within the merchan-
tability context, a court might be justified in applying well established and
recognized negligence rules.
If the unmerchantable defect is said to be a failure to warn of a
product danger, then logically there must be a danger present before a duty
to warn may be imposed. There would be no duty to warn if there were no
danger.9 5 The Reid decision never even considered whether there was
indeed a danger. From the opinion, the court appeared only to require the
plaintiff to allege an injury by the product. The plaintiff did not have to
show that the product could produce the harm he alleged. Nor did the
opinion focus on the minimum degree of danger necessary for the
imposition of a duty. Even under strict liability the danger must be
unreasonable before a warning will be required. 96 Negligence cases hold
that there is no duty to warn when there is only a remote possibility of
danger 97 or when this type of accident has never been known to occur.98 In
Reid, however, despite a showing that no prior similar accidents had
occurred out of the thousands of cans marketed99 and evidence that the
accident as alleged could not be duplicated,100 the court held the danger to
be one requiring a warning.
91. Id. at 242.
92. Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 627, 549 P.2d 1383, 1386 (1976).
93. Wilhelm v. Globe Solvent Co., 373 A.2d 218 (Del. Super. 1977).
94. Id. at 223.
95. Although there seem to be no warranty cases on point, a number of negligence cases have
adopted this position, i.e., that there is no duty to warn if there is no danger. Bish v. Employers Liab.
Assur. Corp., 236 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1956); Robbins v. Georgia Power Co., 47 Ga. App. 517, 171 S.E.
218 (1933); Soto v. E. C. Brown Co., 283 A.D. 896, 130 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1954). See Pontifex v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 226 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1955); Briggs v. Nat'l. Indus., Inc., 92 Cal. App. 2d 542,207 P.2d
110 (1949).
96. RESTATNIENT (SECOND) OFToRTs § 402A, commentj (1966).
97. Bish v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp. 236 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1956); Pontifex v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 226 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1955); Twombley v. Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476, 158 A.2d
I 10 (1960); Katzv. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1959).
98. Stiefv. J. A. Sexauer Mfg. Co., 380 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 897 (1967);
Persons v. Gerlinger Carrier Co., 227 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1955); Hunter v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours &
Co., 170 F. Supp. 352 (D. Mo. 1958); Beck v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 76 Wash. 2d 95,455
P.2d 587 (1969).
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Cases also indicate that, under the implied warranty of merchantabili-
ty, actual knowledge or a reason to know of dangers is a prerequisite to the
imposition of a duty to warn. In Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,'01 a
drug manufacturer was aware from its own tests and field reports that its
new product for treatment of arteriosclerosis might also produce side
effects such as cataracts, thinning hair, skin irritation, and blood changes,
but continued to promote the drug without warning. The court found the
product "was not properly labeled in that it did not give adequate warning
of inherent dangers," and hence there was a breach of an implied
warranty.10 2 Neither the manufacturer nor seller in Reid had that degree of
knowledge of dangers connected with the antiperspirant nor was the injury
clearly one that was foreseeable. Quite the contrary, it was a freak accident.
Of the thousands of units of the deodorant marketed, no similar accidents
had been reported, 103 and efforts to duplicate the incident had failed.
0 4
The manufacturer did have knowledge that the formulation was ninety-
two percent alcohol and was charged with the knowledge of foreseeable
harm connected with a high content of alcohol, but he also was aware that
government standards did not consider this a flammable formulation.'0 5
The question is whether there was enough knowledge of foreseeable harm
to impose a duty to warn, a question that the Reid opinion completely
ignored.
As under negligence and strict tort principles, the implied warranty of
merchantability imposes no duty to warn of a danger of which the user has
actual knowledge.10 6 To illustrate, in Wilhelm v. Globe Solvent Co., 0 7 the
injured party was an experienced dry cleaning worker, and the court was
convinced that he was well aware of the flammable propensities of the
solvent. Based on those facts the court found no duty to warn, explaining
that "there is no duty to warn where the user has actual knowledge of the
alleged danger"' 8 and that such a duty exists only "when those to whom
the warnings would go can reasonably be assumed to be ignorant of the
facts which a warning would communicate.' 0 9
These cases, when read together with U.C.C. section 2-316(3) (b) may
obviate any duty to warn where there is an open and obvious danger. That
section reads:
rW]hen the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or
101. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689,60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
102. Id. at709, 60 Cal. Rptr. at413.
103. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 4, Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476, 253
S.E.2d 344 (1979).
104. Id. at 5-7.
105. Id.at5.
106. Wilhelm v. Globe Solvent Co., 373 A.2d 218 (Del. Super. 1977); Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc.,
219 Kan. 627,549 P.2d 1383 (1976); Atkins v. Arlans Dept. Store, 522 P.2d 1020 (Okla. 1974).




UCC DUTY TO WARN
the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods
there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination
ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him."0
Presumably if a danger or defect is open and obvious it would be
discovered on an examination; an unreasonable failure to examine
resulting in injuries may be said to result from the buyer's actions rather
than as a proximate result of a breach of warranty."' Hence a supplier is
not obligated to warn with respect to obvious dangers; the burden is on the
buyer to protect himself against these.
Although the danger in Reid may not have been obvious, the plaintiff
may have had "actual knowledge of the alleged danger."' 12 Cigarette
smokers surely must be presumed to know of the fire hazards inherent in
the habit; regular smokers must be aware that a stray spark or an errant
matchhead may easily set off a fire. They also must know of the dangers
involved in smoking around flammable substances and materials. Mr.
Reid admitted his awareness of alcohol in the deodorant." 3 Despite
plaintiff's knowledge of the danger, however, the court still found that a
warning was necessary.
Being confined to summary judgment considerations and also to the
facts of the case, the Reid opinion did not discuss all the possible
limitations upon the finding of a duty. The duty to warn may or may not
arise as a function of the use to which the product is being put. The implied
warranty of merchantability only applies when a product is being used for
its ordinary purpose. 14 Hence, the court in Turner v. Manning, Maxwell
and Moore, Inc." 5 concluded that there was no duty to warn of the
dangerous characteristics of a hoist. The evidence showed that the hoist
was reasonably safe for its intended purpose or for some other reasonably
foreseeable purpose, and that the danger arose only when the hoist was
misused. The breach of the implied warranty of merchantability theory
failed because the hoist was reasonably safe for its intended use and the
implied warranty does not apply when the product is being used in a
manner or for a purpose for which it was not intended." 6 Thus a supplier
need only warn of dangers connected with the intended or foreseeable use
of his products. 1 7 Misuse of the product may be a defense to a claim of a
failure to warn under the implied warranty of merchantability."'
The Reid defendant argued vigorously that the formulation's
110. U.C.C.§2-316(3)(b).
111. U.C.C. § 2-316, comment 8.
112. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
113. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 4, Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476, 253
S.E.2d 344 (1979).
114. 1 R. HusH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAw OF PRODucTs LIABILITY § 3:31 (2d ed. 1974).
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compliance with government flammability standards obviates, as a matter
of law, any duty to warn." 9 The United States Department of
Transportation requires certain tests to determine the flammability of
aerosols. 20 Based on these tests, the contents of the five-day antiperspirant
in question were nonflammable.12  The court rejected the view that
compliance with government standards makes a product merchantable as
a matter of law. 122 It suggested that such evidence may be "pertinent to the
issue of the existence of a breach of warranty,"'' 2 3 but it was not clear
regarding how this evidence should be applied to the case.
White and Summers suggest that government standards and
regulations are one area to which an attorney should look in attempting to
define the merchantability of a product.124 They indicate that there is
"powerful evidence" of unmerchantability if a product does not meet a
requirement of a government standard,125 but they do not discuss whether
compliance with a regulation makes a product merchantable. A few early
cases suggested that when the defendant has demonstrated compliance
with government standards and the plaintiff has not presented contradic-
tory evidence, the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict. 126 More recent
cases indicate that although all government regulations and requirements
have been met, a jury is not bound to accept this evidence; rather, it is a
question of fact for the jury. 2 7 For example, in Brown v. Globe
Laboratories, Inc., 128 a lamb vaccine was manufactured and produced in
full compliance with all government regulations, but circumstantial
evidence demonstrated that the vaccine had not performed as it was
intended; rather it killed and injured a number of lambs. The court held
that circumstantial evidence may be used to demonstrate breach of
warranty in spite of the manufacturer's evidence of compliance with
government standards.
129
The cases today are more inclined to follow Globe Laboratories view
119. Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476,483,253 S.E.2d 344,349 (1979).
120. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 5, Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476, 253
S.E.2d 344 (1979).
121. Id.
122. Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476,483,253 S.E.2d 344,349 (1979).
123. Id.
124. J. WHITE& R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9-7 (1980).
125. Id.at295.
126. Richards v. H.K. Mulford Co., 236 F.2d 677 (6thCir. 1916); Howard v. United Serum Co.,
202 Iowa 822, 211 N.W. 419 (1926); Hollingsworth v. Midwest Serum Co., 183 Iowa 280, 162 N.W. 620
(1917); Durrett v. Baxter Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 198 Neb. 392, 253 N.W.2d 37 (1977); Murphy v.
Sioux Falls Serum Co., 47 S.D. 44, 195 N.W. 835 (1923).
127. American Cyanamid Co. v. Fields, 204 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1953); KLPR-TV, Inc. v. Visual
Electronics Corp., 327 F. Supp. 315 (W.D. Ark. 197 1); Peckham v. Eastern States Farmers' Exchange,
134 F. Supp 950 (D.R.I. 1955); Brown v. Globe Laboratories, Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151
(1957); Pearson v. Franklin Laboratories, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 133 (S.D. 1977); Jacob E. Decker& Sons,
Inc. v. Capps, 144 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
128. 165 Neb. 138,84N.W.2d 151(1957).
129. Id.
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of government standards. They regard evidence of compliance with
government regulations to be relevant to whether a breach of warranty has
occurred, but such proof is not conclusive. 130 One treatise notes:
Most courts hold that evidence of due care is admissible not to show lack of
negligence, which is not involved in warranty actions, but on the issue
whether there has been a breach of warranty. . . .Obviously, this type of
evidence should have material effect only where plaintiff's evidence on the
issue is less than totally convincing.1
3
'
One case held that it is error to exclude evidence of inspection by Federal
Food and Drug Administration officials of the defendant's food plant to
rebut circumstantial evidence of improper preparation.
3 2
North Carolina has its own case on the role of government standards
and regulations in determining merchantability. In Coffer v. Standard
Brands, Inc., the plaintiff was alleging breach of implied warranty of
merchantability when he injured a tooth biting down on an unshelled nut
in a package of mixed nuts. The North Carolina Board of Agriculture had
the authority to adopt rules and regulations governing the sale of mixed
nuts, and according to the court these regulations demonstrated a
tolerance in the trade for some unshelled nuts in a package. 134 Thus, the
court concluded, the container of nuts was merchantable, and the
defendant was entitled to a directed verdict.13 5 In reaching its decision, the
Coffer court stated: "In assessing the merchantability of goods under G.S.
25-2-314(2) (a) through (f), various state and federal regulatory acts are
instructive. This is especially pertinent in regard to a determination of
merchantability under G.S. 25-2-314(2) (a), (C).' 136
The Reid court, however, attempted to distinguish Coffer and
seemingly ignored defendant's evidence that the deodorant conformed
with federally set standards for flammability. Their view was that the
plaintiff's complaint was not that the deodorant was unmerchantable
because of impurities in the formulation as in Coffer, but rather that the
product was unmerchantable because it failed to provide adequate
warnings of dangers in the product. 37 The court thus reasoned that the
evidence of the formulation's compliance with government standards was
not relevant to the inadequate label issue.13 1
The opinion was not clear regarding whether this evidence had no
bearing on the case or whether the court was merely declaring that it was
130. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.03 [4] [a] [i] at 3A-99 n.14.8
(1979).
131. Id.
132. Savage v. Peterson Distrib. Co., 379 Mich. 197, 150 N.W.2d 804 (1967).
133. 30 N.C. App. 134,226 S.E.2d 534 (1976).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 139,226 S.E.2d at 537.
137. Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc.,40 N.C. App. 476,253 S.E.2d 344 (1979).
138. Id.
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not conclusive as a matter of law. If it is the latter view, the court was
probably on firm ground, but they offered little guidance concerning how
this evidence should be received by the factfinder. If it is the former, the
court was not in line with Coffer or the trend of current cases, for generally
such information has some relevance. For example, the court's attempt to
distinguish Coffer did not eliminate the probative value of the compliance
evidence. The opinion emphasized that the claim of unmerchantability
arose from a failure to warn of dangers, but before a warning is required
there needs to be a danger.13 9 Evidence of compliance with government
standards should at least go to the question whether the product is in fact
dangerous and hence whether warning is needed to make the product
merchantable. Although not necessarily conclusive, evidence that the
formulation meets accepted government standards for flammability does
tend to show that the product may not be dangerous to the point of
requiring a warning. Perhaps another question that should have been
considered in Reid was whether the label itself was in conformity with
government requirements.
40
C. Inadequacy of Warning
Assuming a warning has been placed on the label, when is it adequate
and what is its effect? An appropriate warning would seem to vitiate or
limit the implied warranty of merchantability with respect to the dangers
mentioned. 14' Despite the U.C.C.'s requirement of specific conspicuous
language to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability,1
42
a warning that dangers may result from use in a particular manner logically
should give the user notice that the product should not be used in that way.
It follows that such a use would not be within the ordinary purposes for
which such goods are used and hence outside the purview of the implied
warranty of merchantability.
Such was the holding of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
in Taylor v. Jacobson. 143 In that case, plaintiff suffered a severe reaction to
139. See text accompanying notes 95-105 supra.
140. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. regulates cosmetics
including "articles . . . sprayed on . . . the human body" and prohibits false and misleading labels.
21 U.S.C. § 321. The Act, however, does not create a private right of action. Florida exrel. Broward
County v. Eli Lilly & Co., 329 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Fla. 1971). On the other hand, the Consumer Product
Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et seq., provides a private cause of action and a private right of
enforcement, including costs and reasonable attorney's fees under §§ 2072-73 for individuals injured by
products. However, by definition, the Consumer Product Safety Act expressly excludes coverage of
cosmetics that are regulated by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
141. W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 195 (1979).
142. The Code provides:
(2) Subject to subjection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability
or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be
conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be
by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is
sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the
description on the face hereof."
U.C.C. §2-316(2).
143. 336 Mass. 709, 147 N.E.2d 770 (1958).
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a hair dye and accordingly alleged that the product was not of
merchantable quality and not fit to be used upon her hair. Both the box
and the bottle contained warnings that the dye contained ingredients that
might irritate some people and referred the user to an accompanying
booklet with instructions for a patch test prior to use. Plaintiff read the
instructions but ignored the patch test provision. The court held:
[A] retailer's implied warranty of merchantability with respect to goods not of
his manufacture is no wider than that they are reasonably suitable for the
ordinary uses for which goods of that description are sold when used in
accordance with reasonable, intelligible and adequate warnings and
instructions known, or which should have been known to the purchaser.
1 44
The court found that the warnings and instructions were sufficiently clear
as a matter of law and that since the plaintiff disregarded adequate
instructions she could not rely upon the implied warranty of merchan-
tability.
45
Assuming a warning is necessary to make a product merchantable, the
next problem is determining its adequacy. Some guidelines regarding what
will be sufficient to discharge a duty to warn under the implied warranty of
merchantability would be helpful .for retailers and manufacturers, but
Reid and other warranty cases offer only minimal discussion of the matter.
The Reid court concluded that the warning given on the can was
insufficient as'a matter of law to give plaintiff adequate notice of any
dangers. 146 The opinion indicated that warnings on the can must inform
the user of any dangers inherent in-the package and also any dangerous
propensities of the product contained therein. 147 The court found that the
warning on this particular aerosol can was inadequate because, in the
court's opinion, it only referred to the can itself and did not inform of the
flammability of the formulation. 14s As far as requiring the warning to go to
any dangers inherent in the product, the court is in line with section 2-3 14,
for its requirement of merchantability clearly applies to both the product
and the package. 149 Their reading of the warning, however, is not so easy to
accept. The warning on the can read:
WARNING: Use only as directed. Do not apply to broken, irritated or
sensitive skin. If rash or irritation develops discontinue use. Never spray
toward face or flame. Do not puncture or incinerate can. Do not expose to
heat or store at temperatures above 1200 F. Intentional misuse by deliberately
concentrating and inhaling the contents can be harmful or fatal. Keep out of
reach of children. 50
144. Id. at 716, 147 N.E.2d at 775.
145. Id., 147 N.E.2d at 775-76.
146. Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476,253 S.E.2d 344 (1979).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Schuessler v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 279 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973); Gillispie v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 14 N.C. App. 1, 187 S.E.2d 441 (1972); Pugh v. J.C. Whitney & Co., 9
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Lucchesi v. H.C. Bohack Co., Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 326
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
150. Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476,478,253 S.E.2d 344,346 (1979).
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The court emphasized that "[t]he warnings of the label are easily under-
stood to refer to the can itself and its proper use. No specific warnings
about the use and formulation of the deodorant itself are given."' 5' This
writer suggests that the warning is not so easily understood to apply solely
to the can itself. Surely the statements "Do not apply to broken, irritated
or sensitive skin"' 112 and "If rash develops, discontinue use''  refer to the
formulation and not the aerosol can. One might expect to see those words
on nonaerosol packages. Perhaps the court meant that the fourth and fifth
sentences of the warning could only be understood to refer to the can and
its proper use, but is this clearly evident? Is it because this is an aerosol can
that it is dangerous to spray toward one's face or a flame, or is it the
formulation that makes these actions dangerous, or is it a combination of
both? In any event Reid concluded that "[a] question of fact as to the
sufficiency of the packaging and labeling clearly exists and is one for the
jury."'
154
Many of the cases seem to agree with Reid that ultimately the
adequacy of a warning to make a product merchantable is a question of
fact for the factfinder.'" The question still remains, however, concerning
what the factfinder may or must consider in its evaluation. A general
statement of possible dangers is not enough; rather a sufficient warning
must be specific as to the dangers involved. 56 Apart from warnings of
dangers, instructions for use accompanying a product create an implied
warranty that when so used it is safe and will not injure.157 The label cannot
mislead the user into thinking that following the instructions is sufficient to
eliminate any dangers. 58 With respect to the adequacy of instructions,
Reddick stated: "[T]o satisfy the implied warranty as to merchantability
created by a manufacturer's instructions the latter should be sufficiently
explicit, complete and unambiguous so as not to result in injurious non-
conforming use by ordinary consumers."' 59 The Reid decision added little
to the literature on the question of what standards a warning should be
measured against. Rather, the court neatly sidestepped the problem by
turning it over to the jury with little guidance.
Reid puts manufacturers and sellers in a no-win situation with respect
151. Id. at 482, 253 S.E.2d at 348.
152. See text accompanying note 142 supra.
153. Id.
154. Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476,484,253 S.E.2d 344,350 (1979).
155. Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
251 Cal. App. 2d 689,60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). Cf. Lovev. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378,38 Cal Rptr. 183
(1964); Muncy v. Magnolia Chem. Co., 437 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (negligence cases holding
adequacy of warning is question of fact for the jury).
156. Diamond Alkali Co. v. Godwin, 100 Ga. App. 799, 112 S.E.2d 365 (1959), aff'd, 215 Ga.
839, 114 S.E.2d 40(1960).
157. Griffin v. Planters Chem. Corp., 302 F. Supp. 937 (D.S.C. 1969).
158. Id.
159. Reddick v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 243,250 (S.D. Ga. 1969). Instructions
for use accompanying a product might also create an express warranty under U.C.C. § 2-313.
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to what a warning label must include. Manufacturers are restrained by the
space limitations on the label and by the fact that a product will lose its
competitive edge if it sounds more dangerous than other brands. However,
a warning of known and reasonably foreseeable dangers in a product is a
sensible and legitimate requirement to impose on those who are profiling
from the product. Reid disregarded all this and found the warning
inadequate because it did not embrace the actual harm that occurred. One
wonders whether any warning would have been satisfactory to the Reid
court. For example, the label might have warned "Do not smoke
immediately after application." Arguably this warning would have been
inadequate because it was not Mr. Reid's cigarette that ignited the
deodorant; allegedly it was the striking of a match. Not all matches are
struck in the process of lighting cigarettes; they are also used to light,
among other things, candles, stoves, and campfires. Perhaps a better
warning would have been "Do not strike a match following application of
deodorant." However, matches are not the only items that can start fires. A
spark from a cigarette might produce similar results. Perhaps the warning
should have included "Do not strike a match or smoke immediately after
application." But this may be too specific for it does not mention other
types of flames with which a user might come into contact. Therefore, a
warning that the consumer should "Avoid all flames immediately after
application" might be in order. Such a warning, however, fails to account
for any dangers present during the actual spraying or handling of the
deodorant so perhaps a warning that the "Contents are highly flammable,
avoid contact with any flame during and after application" should have
been used. But this last warning overstates the hazard and sounds too
threatening. A manufacturer might as well not bother to put the product
on the market, for what consumer would want to spray such a dangerous
formulation under his arms?
Such speculation could go on and on, but it misses the point just as
Reid did. The question of what an adequate warning must include should
not focus on every conceivable harm that might occur, nor should it be
measured by whether it covered the harm that actually did occur. Rather, a
warning should inform of known and reasonably foreseeable dangers in a
manner that reflects the likelihood and degree of harm.
Unlike the warranty decisions, negligence cases have considered the
question more thoroughly and have set down some standards for the
factfinder to follow, some of which are summarized in the annotation that
follows:
The warning must be appropriate; implicit in the duty to warn is the duty to
warn with a degree of intensity that would cause a reasonable man to exercise
for his own safety the caution commensurate with the potential danger. From
this it follows that the likelihood of an accident taking place and the
seriousness of the consequences are always pertinent matters to be considered
with respect to the duty to provide a sufficient warning label, and that there is
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a particular need for a sufficient warning where there is a representation that
the product in question is not dangerous.' 6
D. Causation
Presumably, even if a plaintiff proves a duty to warn and
demonstrates the lack of warnings or inadequate warnings, he could not
recover under a breach of section 2-314 unless the failure to warn was the
proximate cause of his injury.'6' Reid, in accord with analogous negligence
cases, said the "inquiry as to proximate causation would focus upon
plaintiff's reliance upon the warnings and instructions and not what agent
was physically responsible for the ignition of the flame."1 62 More precisely,
all a plaintiff needs to show for a prima facie case is that, had an adequate
warning been given, he would have avoided the danger.
163
Since Reid was only looking to the appropriateness of a summary
judgment, that is all the court needed to consider. But there are a number
of ways in which a defendant may demonstrate that the failure to warn was
not the proximate cause of the injury. For example, if a claimant does not
follow instructions or does not read the label, then an inadequate warning
is not the proximate cause.1 64 If a product is being misused in a manner for
which it is not intended, one cannot argue that the failure to warn is the
proximate cause of the injury.161 In negligence cases, courts have also
found that if the person knew of the danger or would not have heeded the
warning, the failure to provide adequate warnings would not be the
proximate cause. 166 Like adequacy, proximate cause is a question of fact
for the jury.' 67
V. CONCLUSION
In effect, Reid creates a cause of action with an easy-to-prove prima
facie case. All a plaintiff needs to allege is that 1) he was injured while using
a product, 2) there was no adequate warning of the danger involved in the
injury, and 3) had he been adequately warned he would have better
160. Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 37(1961).
161. U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 13.
162. Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476,486,253 S.E.2d 344,351(1979).
163. A similar rule has been found in negligence cases. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423
F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970); Thomas v. A.P. De Sanno & Son, Inc., 209 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1954); Haberlyv.
Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958) (en banc).
164. McCleskeyv. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 127 Ga. App. 178,193 S.E.2d 16(1972);Taylor
v. Jacobson, 147 N.E.2d 770 (Mass. 1958).
165. Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245,217 S.E.2d 863 (1975).
166. Borowicz v. Chicago Mastic Co., 367 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1966); Parziniv. Center Chem. Co.,
129 Ga. App. 868, 201 S.E.2d 808 (1973); Patrick v. Perfect Parts Co., 515 S.W.2d 554 (Mo. 1974) (en
banc); Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Morgan, 444
S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
167. Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967); Guardian Ins. Co. v.
Anacostia Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 320 A.2d 315 (D.C. App. 1974); Belly. Menzies, 110 Ga. App. 436,
138 S.E.2d 731 (1964); Martel v. Duffy-Mott Corp., 15 Mich. App. 67,166 N.W.2d 541 (1968); General
Supply & Equip. Co., Inc., v. Phillips, 490 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
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protected himself from the danger either by not using the product in the
proscribed fashion or not using it at all. 168 Reid relieves the consumer of
any obligation to protect himself, even if he has knowledge of the
danger. 69 The decision creates liability under even more lax standards
than strict tort liability because the danger involved does not have to be
unreasonable. 70 The result is that consumers will have an incentive to
bring suit under U.C.C. section 2-314 for any injury, involving a product,
of which they were not warned. If the courts follow Reid, very rarely will
they be able to dismiss on the pleadings, and a great number of cases will
probably be settled to avoid trial.
Until recently, courts probably would have been inclined to give no
relief to victims, such as Mr. Reid, of freak accidents. The advent of strict
liability, however, prodded many courts to accept the notion that society
could and should share the burden of risk of product-related injuries by
holding manufacturers and sellers liable and letting them pass the costs on
to all consumers. Similar reasoning is necessary to justify a finding that
even unforeseeable freak accidents may have to be covered in a warning or
the product will be unmerchantable. Obviously, to warn of every
conceivable and inconceivable danger would be an impossible task for a
manufacturer; he must satisfy himself with a reasonable warning and pass
the cost of freak accident liability on to consumers. Perhaps the time has
come to reconsider whether society can or should bear such a burden. The
American economy is already in the vise grip of double-digit inflation. We
do not need to squeeze consumers more by adding the cost of freak
accidents on to products. Manufacturers and sellers should be held to a
high degree of responsibility for using care in producing, packaging, and
labeling goods, but there are limits to how far they reasonably can go.
Rather than asking consumers to share the costs for occurrences beyond
these limits, perhaps we would benefit more by asking them to share in
exercising some degree of care and responsibility for their own safety.
Reid, however, supports the opposite conclusion.
The result is our society, aided by the courts, has reached the point at
which Americans are no longer responsible for themselves; they are now
entitled to believe that whenever they are injured, someone else should pay.
Candada J. Moore
168. In addition, plaintiff must show that a merchant sold him the goods and provide notice to
the seller of the injury. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
169. See text accompanying notes 106-113 supra.
170. See text accompanying notes 95-100 supra.
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